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President Nixon … During his visits to Indonesia, the President 
continued, it was apparent that  the Dutch had left a mark of progress 
and contribution to Indonesian culture that was evident in many 
areas. He asked the Prime Minister about current Dutch 
relationships with Indonesia. 
The Prime Minister replied that relationships were extremely cordial 
at this  point, having progressed  from a point  of near open warfare 
earlier. Now relationships were warm and cordial, and the visit of the 
Queen to Indonesia last year had been highly successful. 
President Nixon emphasized the importance of Indonesia and its 
great potential, both in terms of population and natural resources.  
 
Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Barend 
Biesheuvel, 26 January 1972.1 
 
Ivan Kats is a little-known figure in international history, yet his skills as 
editor, networker, fundraiser, and cultural troubadour have left their mark 
on modern Indonesian culture. A member of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom’s secretariat (CCF) in Paris during the 1960s, Kats oversaw the 
CCF’s cultural projects in Southeast Asia to spread Western liberal ideals 
among restless intellectual elites looking to establish a post-colonial national 
culture. These cultural projects were funded by the Ford Foundation and, 
earlier, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Exiting from Paris when the 
CIA-CCF connection was about to enter a critical phase, Kats relocated to 
Yale and set about creating a successor operation, eventually managed 
through his own Obor Foundation.2 A Belgian by birth, Kats was able to 
tap into the Dutch intellectual, policy, and corporate circles that maintained 
an interest in Indonesia, providing a link between US and Dutch Cold War 
and capitalist interests in Southeast Asia. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Kats, 
via Obor, had a profound influence in Indonesia as Suharto’s New Order 
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regime sought to shape a new national identity through a carefully 
monitored culture industry.  
Studies of both the CCF and the Indonesian culture industry have 
often referred to Kats’ role, but never in detail. Of particular importance 
has been Kats’ relations with key cultural producers who emerged as pivotal 
figures in the aftermath of the 1965-66 political turmoil and the end of the 
Sukarno regime. Of the main histories of the CCF, only Peter Coleman 
mentioned him in relation to the organization’s efforts to build relations 
with Indonesian anti-communist intellectuals.3 David Hill and Janet Steele 
recount that Kats was influential in nurturing relations with around 150 
‘democratic intellectuals’ during the early 1960s by means of distributing 
books, arranging for study grants to attend European institutions, and 
generally providing moral support in an increasingly challenging political 
environment.4 Others have been more critical, interpreting Kats as part of a 
wider coordinated campaign to undermine Indonesian cultural 
independence by promoting Western liberal ideals and, as a consequence, 
tacitly condoning violence against the Communist party and its supporters.5 
This article explores Kats’ role as a privateering ‘cultural diplomat’ 
in the service of Cold War anti-communism, Western corporate interests, 
and US philanthropy. It discusses the relevance of Kats from a ‘New 
Diplomatic History’ perspective, interpreting his role in relation to three 
research fields: the history of philanthropy; books as cultural products; and 
Kats as a cultural broker. Strictly speaking, Kats is a civilian who never had 
any official diplomatic status. He was not employed by the foreign services 
of either the United States or the Netherlands. From the view of most of 
the existing literature, Kats is no more than a walk-on player without any 
particular significance. In contrast, the aim here is to explore Kats’ own 
‘diplomatic agency’ as an intellectual, philanthropist, and cultural 
entrepreneur moving between the West and the East. New Diplomatic 
History expands the range of enquiry across the environment of diplomatic 
activity, so that figures such as Kats, strictly speaking not a diplomat, can be 
seen as taking on diplomat-type roles. This alters our perception of 
diplomacy from a closed-off world of officially designated professionals to a 
                                                 
3 P. Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York 1989) 208. 
4 D. Hill,  Journalism and Politics in Indonesia:  A Critical Biography of  Mochtar Lubis (1922-
2004) (London 2010) 74; J. Steele, Wars Within (Jakarta 2014) 48. 






fluid, mobile, diverse field of actors each contributing to the overall fabric 
of diplomatic interactions. 
 
 
Cold War Culture 
 
The key to understanding Kats’ wider role is his relationship with the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). 6  The CCF is one of the most 
notorious episodes in the ‘cultural Cold War’ due to it representing the 
merger of liberal ideals and covert action. On 26 June 1950 – the day the 
Korean war broke out – the CCF held its inaugural conference in West 
Berlin. It was part of the increasingly intense contest to organize Western 
societies around competing visions of the future: the democratic capitalist 
path under the tutelage of the United States, or the collectivist egalitarian 
path under the lodestar of the Soviet Union. Based on the prestige and 
cultural capital of its prominent members, the CCF that emerged from West 
Berlin sought to represent the baseline for cultural freedom worldwide. Its 
manifesto issued at the conference was a bold statement on the use and 
abuse of freedom of expression by political power. Claiming that ‘no 
political philosophy or economic theory … no race, nation, class or religion 
can claim the sole right to represent the idea of freedom’, the CCF set itself 
up as the guardian of the open, pragmatic ‘market-place of ideas’ ideal of 
post-war liberalism. The CCF was the cultural version of Arthur 
Schlesinger’s Vital Center.7 
The conference led to a permanent organization based in Paris. 
Moving away from militant anti-communism, the CCF adopted a high-
modernist cultural agenda and anti-neutralist, reformist, secular, centrist 
politics that would be typecast later in the decade as the ‘end of ideology’.8 
From the late 1950s onwards, the CCF looked to extend its reach into new 
territory: Africa, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. Looking to support 
                                                 
6 For a useful overview of some of the major CCF histories, see: E. Pullin, ‘The 
Culture of Funding Culture: The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom’, in : 
C.R. Moran and C.J. Murphy eds., Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US. 
Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh 2013).  
7 A. Schlesinger Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of  Freedom (Boston 1949). 
8 See: G. Scott-Smith, ‘The “Masterpieces of the 20th Century” Festival and the 
Congress  for Cultural Freedom: Origins and Consolidation, 1947-1952’,  Intelligence 





modernization and foment nascent liberal tendencies in the newly-
independent nations of the Global South, these ventures rarely secured 
solid footholds in an increasingly unforgiving socio-political environment. 
Castroism and the Vietnam War politicized the cultural scene with an anti-
Americanism that stretched the ‘openness’ of the CCF’s Cold War 
consensus liberalism. In the early years these endeavours were largely 
funded by the CIA, as part of their campaign to bolster anti-communist 
(particularly ‘non-communist left’) political elements and foster a broad 
liberal consensus in line with US interests. By the 1960s, the Ford 
Foundation, initially wary of being associated with covert operations, 
decided to take on full responsibility for the CCF. When the CIA 
connection was revealed in 1967 and the CCF was effectively declared 
intellectually bankrupt, it was soon revived as the International Association 
of Cultural Freedom (IACF) with continuing Ford patronage. The IACF, 
although a chastened organization lacking real intellectual authority, 
nevertheless continued much the same line as before. 
The historiography on the CCF was originally focused on the 
extent to which the CIA controlled the organization, not just in terms of 
financial support but also in terms of cultural direction, and to what extent 
this undermined its claims to be representing ‘cultural freedom’. Thus, Peter 
Coleman’s The Liberal Conspiracy defended the purpose of the organization 
despite the CIA link. Pierre Grèmion and Volker Berghahn both placed the 
CCF within a broader understanding of transatlantic cultural relations that 
rescued some of its significance. On the other side, Frances Stonor 
Saunders regarded the whole affair as a conspiratorial sham that exposed 
the hypocrisy of ‘Western values’. 9  In contrast, more recent titles have 
sought to investigate the CCF as a cultural actor of global importance. They 
emphasize its network of publications that proselytized its anti-communism 
under multiple headings, or its lasting impact on nurturing new generations 
of post-colonial/post-modern cultural actors across Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa.10 In these readings, it is not a question of CIA or no CIA, but of 
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how we might include the CCF within a broader understanding of emerging 
cultural identities, confrontations, and campaigns. In terms of the CCF 
hierarchy, Kats worked under the CCF executive secretary John Hunt as 
part of the Asia section, and the focus of most scholars on the prominent 
figures and decision-makers would explain why he has up till now largely 
been hidden from view. But Kats’ importance comes from his role in 
perpetuating the CCF mission after 1967 under a different guise, allied to , 








Kats came from a Flemish Jewish/Catholic family living in Brussels, and he 
left Europe with his sister for the United States just before war broke out in 
1939. After studying philosophy at City College NY, he moved to the 
Sorbonne in 1946, but Parisian café society was too enticing. He drifted into 
a series of writing and translation jobs, including for NATO’s public 
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relations office, where he worked on the periodical Occident-Western World in 
the late 1950s. After meeting John Hunt at a cocktail party, Kats joined the 
CCF staff some time in 1959-1960. By the early 1960s, he was working 
closely with Hunt on the expansion of Congress activity in the Middle East 
and Asia, in particular through its journals. Kats had a background that 
fitted this role well. An émigré from Nazi Europe, Kats’ mother came from 
a family of military and civil service administrators in the Dutch East Indies, 
and his father had built up a commercial trade in clothing with the same 
colony. Kats had been raised with a fascination for Southeast Asia, was 
committed to the anti-communist cause, and determined to spread Western 
intellectual ideals as part of the cultural modernization of Asian life. 
  Kats gradually focused more on the Asia-Pacific region. In 1962, he 
was sent by Hunt on a trip to South Asia to evaluate the intellectual-cultural 
environment for CCF activities. By focusing on the need to modernize 
education, he advocated tapping into the dissatisfaction of the post-colonial 
Pakistani intelligentsia.11 A promotor of developing CCF contacts in South 
Korea, particularly the journal Sasanggye led by Chang Chun Ha,12 he soon 
had a direct impact on two CCF publications: Horison in Indonesia and 
Solidarity in the Philippines, both created in 1966. Horison was created by 
Mochtar Lubis, one of the pioneers of independent journalism through the 
daily Indonesia Raya, which he co-founded in 1949 as a platform to generate 
a critical public sphere in newly-independent Indonesia. Lubis became a 
determined critic of both President Sukarno and the Communist party. This 
led to his connection with the CCF, which both supported him during his 
stints in jail and provided him with an international network to strengthen 
his cause. After being released following the events of September 1965 and 
the subsequent elimination of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) by 
the military and its paramilitary allies, Lubis founded Horison. It was a 
deliberate move to signify a fresh cultural movement under what would 
become Suharto’s New Order. The journal soon became ‘a path-breaking 
monthly cultural and literary journal, forged by an alliance of young 
generation cultural activists and highly respected senior authors and literary 
                                                 
11  Ivan Kats to John Hunt, 13 October 1962, Folder 3 Box 207, Ivan Kats 
Correspondence 1959-1966, IACF Archive, Regenstein Library, University of 
Chicago (hereafter IK CCF). 
12 Ivan Kats to John Hunt, ‘Our Work in Korea’, 6 September 1962, Folder 3 Box 





figures’.13 Lubis shrugged off the CIA-CCF recriminations of the late 1960s 
and, in return for Congress support during the years of his imprisonment, 
even joined the IACF Executive Board in the early 1970s. 14 Mochtar Lubis 





Image 2:  Mochtar Lubis and  Ivan Kats, n.d.. Source:  Box 12, 
Series VI,  Ivan Kats Papers, MS 2048, Manuscripts  and 
Archives, Yale University Library 
 
Lubis was part of a small-scale, liberal-minded, Western-orientated young 
intelligentsia who challenged both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes on their 
repression of civil liberties and basic intellectual freedoms from the 1950s 
                                                 
13 D. Hill ed., Beyond the Horizon: Short Stories f rom Contemporary Indonesia (Clayton 
1998) xix-xx. 
14 D. Hill, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of  Mochtar Lubis (1922-
2004) as Editor and Author (London 2010) 112-120. 





through to the 1980s. Kats, who worked closely with other key figures such 
as Goenawan Mohamed and Arief Budiman, saw his role as assisting this 
formation of a pro-Western outlook through the cultural patronage of first 
the CCF and later Obor. This patronage was pursued in highly contested 
territory, both figuratively and literally. The effects of colonialism on all 
areas of Indonesian social and political life and cultural psyche ran deep, 
since Indonesia itself, as an entity, was a colonial creation. The CCF and 
Obor promoted Western liberal values to tie the post-colonial intelligentsia 
into the circuits of US-centred educational and cultural exchange. These 
campaigns therefore clashed with alternative visions of the future, be they 
leftist or traditionalist, that saw ongoing Western influence in any form as 
neo-colonialism. The years 1965-1966 marked a turning point in this 
struggle, since the outlawing of the PKI and the mass killings that were 
justified under the heading of anti-communism paved the way for the end 
of Sukarno and the arrival of the ‘New Order’ regime of General Suharto. 
Suharto’s economic policies essentially ‘relied on the exploitation of natural 
resources and cheap labour, using the same methods of domination and 
coercion like its colonial predecessor’.16 Even though one was forged on 
nationalist anti-colonialism and its successor on military authoritarianism, 
the space for critique through the channels of civil society was equally 
narrow under both regimes. Lubis was imprisoned by both for demanding 
the right of freedom of expression in the press, an indication that the 
margins for manoeuvre in the fields of cultural expression were narrow, 
regardless of which regime was in power. It is in the context of this charged 
cultural environment that we need to understand the role and motivation of 
someone like Ivan Kats, who took it upon himself to try and widen those 
margins, albeit from a particular, Western-orientated perspective.  
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Image 3: Ivan Kats, Goenawan Muhammed, and Evelina Kats, 
n.d.. Source:  Box 12,  Series VI,  Ivan Kats Papers, MS 2048, 
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library 
 
In 1969 Kats guest edited a special issue of Quadrant, the Australian journal 
established under CCF auspices. He collected together the vanguard of 
Indonesia’s dissident writers and activists from the Sukarno period, 
including Goenawan Muhammed, Arief Budiman, Mochtar Lubis, 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and Taufiq Ismael. Kats opened the issue 
declaring that these were 
 
men at grips with basic problems, and approaching the same basic 
problems in ways that  are conflicting. Indonesia’s  literature after 
some 40 years has come to constitute a modern cultural history 
which runs parallel to the social and political evolution, and which 
can be read as the sensitive record of a struggle for self-realization.17 
 
Kats then charted the way forward:  
 
The problem that  looms large in  the background of this inquiry is  of 
course the profound deterioration of Indonesia’s schools and 
universities; of the world of book and newspaper publishing; of all 
                                                 





those social and cultural and educational institutions and facilities 
which, after having educated the citizen, normally provide him with 
employment, and weave a web of modernism and opportunity 
around him, so that he may use his  learning fo r his own and society’s 
benefit…  Is Indonesia able to bear the burden of reconstruction in 





Philanthropy has generally been regarded as the provision of patronage for 
the purpose of improving social conditions in order to alleviate the effects 
of inequality and poverty. Philanthropists provide assets and skills for the 
general improvement of social life, be that through education, healthcare, or 
other forms of socio-economic welfare. In its purest form, it is not 
motivated by political or economic influence or gain. Whereas charity is 
based on the act of giving to solve an immediate need and relieve suffering, 
philanthropy is based on the channelling of assets to solve social problems 
over the longer term. This sets philanthropy apart, as a means to actually 
change society rather than simply attend to society’s weaknesses.19 
Large-scale philanthropy emerged in the United States as a result of 
the trade-off that occurred between political power and financial wealth in 
the early twentieth century. Faced with increasing criticism and powerful 
moves to break up their economic dominance through anti-cartel legislation 
and stringent tax laws, corporations such as Standard Oil were able to 
channel a major part of their assets into tax-free foundations geared to 
promoting the public good. Andrew Carnegie, made extremely wealthy with 
the sale of his steel firm to US Steel in 1901, transformed his wealth into a 
major vehicle of influence both domestically and internationally through the 
formation of the Carnegie Corporation in 1911.20 Similar institutions such 
as the Century Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and later the Ford 
Foundation were based on shared principles of ‘giving for good’. Yet 
despite their large-scale activities around the globe over the past century, 
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History of  American Charity  (Philadelphia 2015). 
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relatively little research has been done on their relationship with US foreign 
policy.21 As a rule, US philanthropy, in order to hold onto its tax-exempt 
status, has had to claim a benign position of ‘scientific impartiality, 
ideological-political neutrality, and being above the market and independent 
of the state’.22 In doing so, these institutions have largely fallen outside of 
international relations studies that continue to focus on the state as the 
prime entity. Research into the creation of global civil society has tended to 
maintain the view that foundations operate as neutral participants sustaining 
the humanizing role of NGOs without any further agenda. Within 
international history, while foundations have been picked up by the 
‘transnational turn’, this has also largely been done with an uncritical 
acceptance of their motives and a lack of insight into the power relations 
involved. In response, historians such as Inderjeet Parmar, drawing on the 
older work of Edward Berman, have put together a critical model that views 
the large foundations as appendages to the US state. According to Parmar, 
through the twentieth century the major foundations broadly shared the 
same assumptions of the beneficent influence of US power around the 
globe, with the two linked via an elites-only revolving door for senior 
positions.23  
This reading of philanthropy, and its close association with the 
pursuit of US interests around the globe (in contrast to the apolitical, 
egalitarian outlook put forward by its own publicity), presents a d ifferent 
context for the story of Kats and Obor. Kats had already encountered the 
Ford Foundation’s support for modernization projects during his years at 
the CCF, and from 1966 he set out to develop a new venture that would be 
appealing to these same modernizers of the major foundations. Facing the 
demise of the CCF and the termination of his Indonesia projects, he moved 
to the Center for South-East Asian Studies at Yale. It was from that base 
that he began to reach out to first the Rockefeller and then the Ford offices 
with the blueprints for what would become the Obor Foundation. In 
                                                 
21 See: M. Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad: A History  (New Brunswick NJ 1963);  
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February 1970 Kats issued a first proposal for the Rockefeller Foundation, 
pitching the new venture as a means for  
 
re-establishing contacts between the Indonesian educated elite and 
the West,  and re-introducing into Indonesian  intellectual life the 
critical approach common to the social sciences which was rejected 
during [Sukarno’s] Guided Democracy under the joint impact of 
state ideology and PKI propaganda.24 
 
Kats envisioned a combined, coordinated approach, channelling 
philanthropic support from the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, 
and Japan. Crucially, ‘Responsibility for the direction of cultural aid 
programs should lie with the Indonesians themselves’. This was to be the 
key motif of Obor – it was not to function as an outside-in organization, 
simply bringing knowledge and expertise to the Global South regardless of 
the specific wants and needs of the receivers. Instead, it aimed to empower 
those groups who were looking to advance their societies by means of 
Western know-how, but wanted to do so on their own terms. Kats was thus 
not only distancing himself from the one-size-fits-all US-based modernizers 
of the 1960s, but also making a subtle move away from the CCF approach. 
Through its journals and conferences the Congress had provided outlets for 
cultural expression around the globe, but still based on the belief of a liberal 
universalist value system attuned to the needs of all. 25 In contrast, Obor was 
to be about listening to the voices of those who were deemed worthy of 
such support, and adapting the aid package accordingly. Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia was incorporated as an Indonesian legal entity with this purpose 
in 1975, and as of 2019 still exists in this form. 
 The path to success was long and hard. Initial contacts with the 
Rockefeller Foundation were met with some scepticism as to the longer-
term business model. Kats, who was much more comfortable in the fields 
of philosophy, literature, and the art of translation, had to develop a 
coherent, potentially solvent apparatus for his new form of cultural 
diplomacy that would satisfy the results-focused philanthropists. Support 
from Lionel Landry, Vice-President of the Asia Society, led to some 
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corporate sponsorship, but the major breakthrough came in 1973 when the 
Ford Foundation issued its first tranche of support: $42,000, for Obor’s 
‘social science publishing project’.26 From then on, up to 1999, the Ford was 
a regular patron of Obor projects, covering publishing and translation, and 
the preservation of cultural heritage. But Obor was always meant to 
function as a kind of ‘cultural buffer’ between big philanthropy’s grand 
schemes and the local cultural entrepreneurs themselves, translating 
philanthropy’s patronage both literally (into texts) and symbolically (into 
defining local needs). 
 
 
Book Channels  
 
The publishing industry did very well from the Cold War. Print of all shapes 
and sizes was central for getting the message across to global audiences, and 
books were considered as one of the most effective ways to export ideas. 
While publishers saw major opportunities for profitably expanding their 
markets, propagandists saw numerous channels for spreading their forms of 
persuasion. In the United States, the linkage between commercial interests 
and political influence had already been made during WWII, when the 
Council on Books in Wartime was established. The Council coordinated 
publishers’ efforts to provide a public service for the war effort while 
benefitting financially at the same time. With totalitarianism of the left and 
right demonstrating the power to shape social norms through control of the 
provision of selected information, books were seen by many as a crucial 
component in revitalizing democratic thought across Europe and beyond.27  
  This approach only escalated as the Cold War took hold, with 
libraries becoming vanguard outposts for ideological campaigns, central to 
the promotion of either a democratic-capitalist or collectivist-communist 
world-view. Cheap publications were the preferred medium for influencing 
literate publics across the decolonizing world regarding the future direction 
of their newly-founded nations. Both overt and covert programmes were 
active in this field. The Free Europe Committee (FEC), funded by the CIA, 
ran covert book programmes to circulate selected titles across Soviet-
                                                 
26 Draft grant announcement, n.d. [1973], Grant Reel 4586 Obor Inc. 1973-1978 II, 
Ford Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archives Center. 
27 J. Hench, Books as  Weapons: Propaganda, Publishing, and the Battle for Global Markets in 





controlled Eastern Europe, the apparatus of which – particularly the 
activities of the FEC’s George Minden – is still not fully disclosed.28 In the 
other direction, the smuggling out of forbidden dissident literature from the 
Soviet sphere was an equally important element of the cultural Cold War, as 
demonstrated by the story of Boris Pasternak’s Dr. Zhivago.29 On the overt 
side, Franklin Book Programs, established in 1952, was the most extensive 
operation using books as ‘tools of modernization’ across Africa and Asia up 
until the 1970s.30 Books were recognized by both East and West as being 
portable, discussable cultural objects that packed a subtle but potentially 








The Obor story brings an extra dimension to this, one that breaks out 
beyond the Cold War framework and fits more within the twentieth century 
dimension of colonialism, post-colonialism, modernization, and 
development. Anti-communism was in this sense a means to achieve a 
greater end – that of securing and embedding a Western-orientated socio-
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economic system and the normative values associated with it. In an 
overview of the Foundation’s outlook from 1995, the challenge had always 
been  
 
(…) how to bring informal parallel Asian and African institutions to 
maturity: independent of government planning, managed by local 
people, drawing increasingly on their own resources and defining a 
new informal style and civic-minded approach.  
 
‘Big philanthropy’ tended to drown out small-scale initiatives because their 
‘size and style of work reflect the conditions of their own societies’ or their 
approach ‘tends to be formal in style and over-ambitious in size.’ In 
response, Obor aimed to position itself as a go-between,  
 
(…) helping local publishers  bring out Indonesian-language books 
on key problems of the community, including civic integrity, family 
planning, and the ethics  of civil service …. Books are published 
locally through reputable publishers and placed on the market at a 
low subsidized price within reach of students and the general reader.  
 
In this sense Obor began as the cultural equivalent to Muhammad Yunus’s 
Grameen Bank, established in 1976 to provide a credit stream to enable 





The designation ‘cultural broker’ comes out of anthropological studies that 
investigated specific competences that enabled individuals to act as 
mediators between cultural differences, providing appropriate services in 
terms of expertise to overcome interpretive misunderstandings and gaps in 
communication.32 Cultural brokerage as a form of practice can be traced to 
the work of Hazel Weidman, who concentrated on those people “who 
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served as links between two cultural systems” or “sociocultural units”.33 As 
a social actor, the broker or mediator is thus someone who effectively 
operates outside or on the edge of the connected communities, respected by 
all sides but not integrated into any of them.34  ‘Brokering’ has also been 
developed as a term in tourism research, where the tour guide is seen more 
as cultural mediator than simple pathfinder, thus translating “the 
strangeness of a foreign culture into a cultural idiom familiar to the 
visitors”.35  
 The role of cultural broker is a useful foil in the context of the 
practice of diplomacy. Acts of mediation, as an effective means to resolve 
disputes, have been central to diplomacy since the beginning of inter-polity 
interactions. Mediation can be defined as ‘a process of conflict resolution, 
related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in 
conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an 
outsider’.36 Diplomatic mediators and cultural brokers share similar traits: 
They are trusted by all parties for their impartiality, they seek to change the 
perceptions of the parties involved in order to assist with problem-solving, 
and they possess a diverse skill set. They often serve at any one time (or at 
the same time) as ‘hosts, observers, facilitators, formulators, educators, 
manipulators, or advocates’.37  
Was Kats a cultural broker/diplomatic mediator, using Obor to 
overcome the distance between the cultures of West and East, North and 
South? Up to a point the model fits on several levels. Obor was deliberately 
positioned to function between ‘big philanthropy’ and small-scale recipients, 
removing the cultural dissonance and dysfunction that large-scale 
development projects often generate. Kats was sensitive to cultural integrity 
and autonomy, striving to find a model that would allow for independent 
development on local terms. He was also a cultural polymath, speaking 
English, Dutch, French, and Spanish. He came from a Belgian Flemish 
Protestant-Jewish family background that he left behind to become an 
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34 See: J. van Willigen, Applied Anthropology: An Introduction (Westport CT 2002). 
35 E. Cohen, 'The Tourist Guide:  The Origins,  Structure and Dynamics of a Role',  
Annals of  Tourism Research 12 (1985) 15. 
36 M. Ahtisaari with K. Rintakoski, ‘Mediation’, in: The Oxford Handbook of  Modern 
Diplomacy (Oxford 2013) 338. 





American citizen and develop a way to re-engage with the images and 
stories of the Indies from his childhood. This confirms the ‘outside’ 
element of Kats’ identity, since he was never wholly part of Belgian, Dutch, 
American, or Indonesian society, always passing between and linking them. 
In this sense he may perhaps fit the cultural broker label better than 
Mochtar Lubis, who was more embedded in the cause of crafting an 
Indonesian national identity.38 Yet behind this transient exterior lies a more 
settled pattern. Obor was always about the one-way transfer of Western 
ideals and ideas to the Indonesian intellectual and educational environment. 
This was its originating purpose, and Kats, who never learned Bahasa 
Indonesian and always corresponded with the Obor offices in Jakarta in 
English, never wavered in his belief in Western-style modernization. The 
question was not whether it should occur, but how best it should occur. 
Whereas on the surface it may look as if Kats is trying to mediate between 
cultures, the details show that he was getting others to translate Western 
liberal norms into Indonesian social reality. There was no impartial position, 
and no attempt to mediate between cultures as if they possessed equal value. 
The cultural broker/diplomatic mediator model therefore only has limited 
interpretive usefulness. Obor represented a curious mix of respect for 
cultural difference and a humanist elitism, being both tolerant and intolerant 
at the same time.  
 
 
Conclusion: Multilayered Diplomacies 
 
Strictly speaking, there is no diplomacy present in the story of Ivan Kats. 
Yet this conclusion is only appropriate if a strict line is drawn around who 
can be a diplomat – only official representatives of the state, so the tradition 
goes, may conduct diplomacy. A broader approach, that stays with the 
notion of diplomacy as the management of international relations via 
negotiation but opens up the possibility for other actors to fulfil this role, 
instead opens up the possibility for exploring the role of others not 
designated under official title. Diplomacy is ‘an inherently plural business 
which encourages an inherently plural outlook’.39 The ‘diplomatic field’ can 
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be widened, not only in the sense of acknowledging the contribution of 
non-state actors in the state-led system, but also in granting a certain 
diplomatic presence to non-state actors themselves, be they individuals or 
institutions. Ivan Kats occupied a space that would normally be claimed – if 
at all – by cultural, transnational, or Cold War historians. By situating this 
narrative within New Diplomatic History, the claim is made that he was 
fulfilling roles that connected to, contrasted with, and made more complex 
the traditional diplomatic relations between Indonesia, the United States, 
and the Netherlands, and that these roles fall outside of a state-based 
diplomatic history narrative. This broad-based approach to diplomatic 
history grants Kats an agency he would not otherwise have had – in fact, it 
rescues the rich complexities of his story from an otherwise marginal 
existence. His relationship with the CCF and thereafter with the Rockefeller 
and Ford Foundations in particular position him as a player within the field 
of Western cultural diplomacy and its sustained efforts to influence and 
shape the future direction of Indonesia as a nation. 40 The ongoing legacies 
of Kats’ work, through Obor, continue to this day. A state-based diplomacy 
narrative will not grasp the full depth of these connections, or the socio-
economic interests that lay behind them.  
 
                                                 
40 See for instance:  B. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and 
US-Indonesian Relations 1960-1968 (Stanford 2010). 
